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A Straw Poll
Suggestions for possible constituent features of a
New International Economic Order are legion.
The cynical dismiss them as the pet gimmicks of
the panacea-mongers; our new Sectarians de-
nounce them as mystifications designed to paper
over the contradictions of the global capitalist
system. Fortunately the world still contains, even
the universities still contain, enough marginal in-
crementalists to keep alive the view that modest
pieces of institutional engineering can help to
make the world just slightly a better place, and
that it is worth working on such devices, refining
them, devising ways of neutralizing the opposi-
tion to them, and even campaigning for them.
Given the record of the past, though, the
optimism of maginal incrementalists is likely
today to be a sober optimism which would count
UNCTAD IV a considerable success if it managed
to reach firm agreement on only one or two of
the major reforms which have been proposed. If
you were a Group of 77 negotiator and you
shared this limited optimism, and if you were
generally concerned with the greatest happiness
of the greatest number among the Group of 77
countries and not, narrowly, only with the
interests of your own, which of the various sug-
gested schemes would you concentrate on as
offering the best combination of feasibility and
general benefit? And why? We put those
questions to a number of people whom we knew
to have thought a good deal about these things.
We print their replies below in the order in which
they were received. The list of possible measures
which we invited them to choose from (or add to)
was as follows:
A buffer stocks scheme for a package of com-
modities initially wholly managed and financed
by Group of 77 countries.
More limited buffer stocks scheme, commodity
by commodity with global participation of all
major producers and consumers.
The UNCTAD proposal for a package of com-
modities with global participation.
Any of the above combined with indexation
agreements about price levels.
A scheme for supply and purchase commit-
ments for selected major commodities.
A compensatory finance scheme as a net addi-
tion to, not diversion of, aid funds.
Formation of new producers associations for
specific commodities among Group of 77
countries.
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Reduction of tariff barriers against LDC manu-
facture.
Specifically reduction of tariffs against pro-
cessed forms of LDC primary products.
Either of the above with specific preferences
for MSAs, etc.
Realistic pledges by aid donors for a substan-
tial move towards the 0.7 per cent of GNP
target.
Comprehensive debt rescheduling scheme.
Establishment of SDR link.
Revision of international patent system and
establishment of a code for the international
transfer of technology.
Establishment of strong advisory service to
strengthen b.argaining capacity of LDCs
vis-à-vis would-be foreign investors.
Code for MNCs.
Co-ordinating agency capable of integrating
development plans in such a way as to promote
inter-LDC trade.
SABURO OKITA, Director, Overseas Economic
Co-operation Fund, Japan.
I would choose the following items in priority
order:
Compensatory finance scheme.
Reduction of tariff barriers against LDC
manufactures.
Reduction of tariffs against processed forms of
LDC primary products.
Both the feasibility of a compensatory finance
scheme and the general benefit it would bring
seem to me high. Compared with a price-support
system it can be pointed to the needs of the most
suffering countries and can avoid the diffusion of
resources among the exporters of primary
products which, for most products, include rich
and poor countries together.
SARWAR LATEEF, Research Officer, Overseas
Development Institute.
Given the strong preference in the Third World
for development strategies that emphasise self-
reliance, most leaders of the '77' would opt for
institutional changes on the trade side rather than
for measures designed to increase the flow of
financial resources to developing countries. But
there is no single institutional change on the trade
side that would meet the criterion of the "greatest
benefit" since the developing world is far from
homogeneous and there are sharp conflicts of
interest in international trade. Schemes involving
buffer stocks and indexation raise as many
problems as they resolve; the poorest countries
may find themselves net losers, while the gains
may be monopolised by developed primary
producers. A further reduction of tariff barriers
seems fairly pointless if no action is taken to
remove non-tariff barriers (not included in the
IDS list); a combination of the two would not
meet the criterion of "feasibility" since it seems
highly implausible that developed countries, faced
with high unemployment, would open the doors
to "cheap imports".
One must, therefore, look somewhat reluctantly
at financial resource transfer measures. Here, the
two most promising ones on the list are (a) a
comprehensive debt rescheduling scheme and (b)
the SDR-aid link. As a result of the deterioration
in their terms of trade, following structural in-
creases in the cost of imports of food, energy and
manufacturers, and a decline in commodity
prices, non-oil developing countries will have
recorded payments deficits averaging $30,000
million in each of the three years since 1973. This
is likely to result in an increase in the outstanding
debt of these countries by 50 per cent to over
$140,000 million by the end of the current year.
Their debt servicing burden is rising sharply, since
a sizable part of the increased debt incurred is in
the form of short-term borrowing on commercial
terms. A massive debt rescheduling exercise would
release resources to finance the expected deficits in
the remaining years of the Second Development
Decade, and thus help restore the lost momentum
of development.
A well-designed SDR-aid link would achieve the
same results. Admittedly, the total impact of either
of these measures would be small compared to
the gains that would accrue from trade-related
measures that actually succeeded in raising the
rate of growth of exports of non-oil developing
countries. (Debt-service payments of non-oil
countries will total $11,000 million in 1976; the
rescheduling exercise would have to be pretty
massive to make a significant impact.) But the
benefits would be more widely shared than in any
single trade related measure which would tend to
benefit a particular group of developing countries
best placed to take advantage of it. My strategy
would be to persuade creditor nations that the
alternative to an agreement on debt rescheduling is
unilateral rescheduling exercises accompanied by
quantitative import controls by debtor nations
pushed to the wall. Since OECD countries are
currently collectively financing their trade deficit
with OPEC by running trade surpluses with the
non-oil developing world, such a development
would be in no one's interest. If resistance to
debt-rescheduling proved too strong, I would shift
emphasis to the SDR-aid link. If one could
persuade the developing countries to stay united
they do have a weapon they could use. They could
threaten to veto the monetary reform package
approved in Kingston and due to be approved by
the Fund's Board of Governors in September, if
that package was not amended to include the
SDR-aid link. The only significant opposition to
it comes from the United States and West
Germany.
HARRY G. JOHNSON, Professor of Economics,
Chicago University, and Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva.
I would choose the lowering of tariff barriers
against manufactured goods trade, and tariff-
binding. Everything else is a gimmick, with pos-
sible benefits likely to be lost. With bound lower
tariffs, members of the Group of 77 would benefit
automatically as they developed the capacity to
produce. Such a tariff reduction might well be
feasible if the Group of 77 were offered tariff-
binding plus (a) no new quantitative restrictions
and (b) an undertaking to eliminate existing
restrictions gradually.
TADASHI KAWATA, Professor of International
Economics, Sophia University, Tokyo.
I would choose your second item, namely, a
limited buffer stocks scheme, commodity by com-
modity, with global participation of all major
producers and consumers. Taking account of both
feasibility as well as general benefit, it seems to
me the best option.
GERALD M. MEIER, Professor of International
Economics, Stanford University.
"If wishes were horses . . ." - and there were an
international public sector - what would we
wish to be its priorities? While the SDR-link
would have symbolic and political significance as
one step towards international distributive justice,
its economic significance would not be as great as
sufficient liquidity and more effective adjustment
mechanisms for the DCs' balance of payments to
prevent international monetary problems from
restricting world trade. The Group of 77 countries
must continually urge greater market access in the
DCs. But if there were an international public
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sector, it would provide more than simple access
to the DC marketsit would actively promote, or
even subsidize, such access for the LDCs.
Given permissive international monetary condi-
tions, the prime objective of UNCTAD IV should
be to speed up the change in the international
division of labor by promoting exports of
manufactures, semi-manufactures, and processed
raw materials from the LDCs. Removal of
quantitative restrictions, reduction of the cascad-
ing in tariff differentials, and the granting of pre-
ferences with 'bite' are necessary to promote
exports of nontraditional commodities from
LDCs. This is essential not only to relax the
foreign exchange constraint; but even more im-
portantly, to stimulate employment. Every
development policy must now be assessed in terms
of its employment-intensity. On this score, a
strategy of "export-substitution industrialization"
can earn high marks. A corollary is the need for
adjustment assistance in DCs. If the export of
manufactures is to be UNCTAD TV's attention,
its success will therefore be predicated on inter-
national monetary reform, on the one side, and on
adjustment assistance (or a new interpretation of
'foreign aid') on the other. But without an inter-
national public sector, can either be achieved?
And may the best that UNCTAD can hope to
achieve still be lamentably too little?
MIGUEL WIONCZEK, National Council for
Science and Technology, Mexico; Chairman at
first session of UNCTAD's Committee on Trans-
fer of Technology.
After having worked for some three years on the
subject of an international code of conduct for the
transfer of technology, and having participated in
the setting up of the UNCTAD Committee for the
Transfer of Technology where the initial stage of
negotiations of such a draft were started last
December, I cannot but be partial. In my opinion
the LDCs should make at UNCTAD IV the
biggest effort possible to speed up these negotia-
tions, keeping in mind that the transfer of
technology is the only item of UNCTAD's
present agenda on which a specific operative
agreement was reached among all the UN
members at the Seventh Special Session of the
UN General Assembly held in New York last
September.
The consensus declaration of that Special Session
of the UN General Assembly entitled Develop-
ment and International Co-operation includes the
following resolution: "All countries should
co-operate in the elaboration of an international
38
code of conduct for the transfer of technology
corresponding in particular to the special needs of
developing countries. The work on this code
should continue within UNCTAD and be con-
cluded so that decisions, including the decision
on the code's legal nature, can be taken at
UNCTAD IV with the objective of adopting a
code of conduct before the end of 1977."
For many years proposals for the regulation of
international technology trade, the only part of
world commerce left completely out of the scope
of multinational institutional arrangements, were
rejected by the major technology-exporting
countries on a number of grounds. The LDCs
were told over and over again that technology
being a non-definable and complicated object of
international transactions, its trade did not lend
itself to any international regulation, that tech-
nology being mostly private property, could not be
the subject of international regulation, and finally
that any attempt to regulate international tech-
nology trade would diminish technology flows to
the LDCs because such regulation would scare
technology-sellers from entering into deals with
restrictively-minded buyers in small, uncertain
and underdeveloped markets. Only last autumn,
however, technology-exporting countries of the
OECD accepted that international technology
regulation is feasible and may be advisable. In
answer to a detailed draft code of conduct
elaborated last summer by the Group of 77 they
presented their own counter-proposals. At present,
technology-exporting countries insist on two
points; first, that international technology trade
regulation should be voluntary, and second that
the LDCs should liberalise their approach towards
the scope of such regulation. Anyone who is fully
cognizant of the details of the draft outline for
an international code of conduct drawn up by the
Group of 77 in UNCTAD must agree, however,
that, while defending their interests, the LDCs
approach the issue with a considerable degree of
realism. Their draft, filed with the UNCTAD
Committee on Transfer of Technology does not
ask of the technology-exporters anything unfair,
unusual or retroactive. First, the LDCs do not
want or expect to receive any proprietary
technology free of charge because they are
cynical enough to be aware that nothing is more
expensive in international relations than those
things that purport to be given free. Secondly,
their quest for some sort of preferential treatment
for the LDCs is only secondary to their quest
for the elimination from international technology
trade of restrictive business practices that are
illegal in most technology exporting countries.
Lastly, the LDCs do not believe that the right to
agreement of a contract involves retroactivity for
the simple reason that the past just cannot be
changed. The changes affect only the future.
Some people within the LDCs are against a code
of conduct for the transfer of technology because
of the alleged risk of "freezing" the conditions of
such transactions at the possible disadvantage of
technology buyers in the LDCs, This defeatist
attitude underestimates the LDCs' technical and
negotiating capability. The draft code prepared at
UNCTAD by the Group of 77 offers a tangible
proof that the major LDCs know at least as much
as industrial countries about technology trade
practices.
Of course the argument in favour of regulating
international technology trade should not be
reduced to the single point that a code of conduct
would make cheaper the acquisition of tech-
nology. The LDCs correctly argue that they need
foreign technology on better terms not for its
own sake but for the purpose of building upon it
a domestic capability to import, absorb, adapt
and create technology. If one agrees that the
creation of an adequate technological capability
at national level is as important as structural
change for modernisingin the broadest social
sensethe underdeveloped world, then it becomes
clear why the LDCs should press at UNCTAD IV
for an acceleration of the process of negotiating
an international code of conduct for the transfer
ot technology.
ISMAIL-SABRI ABDALLA, Director-General,
Institute of National Planning, Cairo.
All measures suggested are attractive. Feasibility
is in many cases a matter of time; what is not
feasible to-day might become operational within
the coming five or ten years. The benefits on the
contrary, vary greatly both regarding the number
of countries and the order of magnitude; in some
cases they are even questionable from a long-
term point of view.
That is why I think the most immediate measure
should be the establishment of a strong "Develop-
ment Co-operation Organization for the Third
World"something that can become the counter-
part of OECD. Such an agency should be of
course intergovernmental, but for its own success
it should focus on surveys, analyses and forecasts,
avoiding as much as possible binding recommen-
dations. It will fulfill the following objectives:
(i) Exchange of information among LDCs
concerning markets, financial and other
conditions of transfer of technology, MNCs
and laws on foreign investments . . . etc.
Identification of areas of co-operation at all
levels: joint ventures, producers' associations,
scientific and technological research, cases for
subregional integration . . . . etc.
Mobilization of some of the Third World
intellectual capacity in search for develop-
ment alternatives, negotiation strategies,
assessment of different proposed measures(such as in the case of the reform of the
international monetary system).
Promotion of studies concerned with cultural
identity, better mutual knowledge and under-
standing, reciprocal technical assistance, etc.
I believe that the coming years will be those of
hard confrontations and tough negotiations. The
statement of principles and the formulation of
claims may remain simple rhetoric, unless the
Third World, through thorough studies, elaborate
tactics, and hard detailed proposals, can prove
itself able to match all the subleties of the
advanced West.
MALCOLM S. ADISESHIAH, Vice-Chancellor,
The University of Madras.
The UNCTAD Plan for building buffer stocks on
Il commodities at a cost of $10.7 billion together
with the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers
against the Third World products are the two
most needed reforms in the international economic
scene. This might stave off the World Bank
prediction that current trendsnational and
internationalwill result in the low-income Third
World countries ending the Seventies with an
average annual per capita growth of 0.2 per cent
for the decade, against the 4 per cent targetted in
the Second Development Decade Strategy.
The buffer stocks will help maintain prices of the
major products of the low-income countries and
help to arrest the 2.2 per cent annual deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade as between 1962-1972
for 28 commodities produced by these countries.
Similarly the dismantling of tariff and non-tariff
barriers will not only increase employment in the
low-income countries, it will benefit the people
of industrial countries in that it will force them
to stop producing low productivity commodities-
both primary and processed productsunder the
protecting wall of these barriers. For producing
these commodities, the comparative cost advan-
tage is with the low-income countries. Capital
and labour in the industrial countries can then
move into high and sophisticated production lines,
increase the wages of the low productivity groups,
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and total welfare in these countries. This kind of
readjustment and rationalisation in international
trade needs to be planned on a short- and long-
term basis.
SIR BERNARD BRAINE, Member of Parlia-
ment, UK.
All the measures on your list are interlinked but
vary considerably in importance and practicability.
Even so, it is difficult to pick out any one item
in isolation. For example, there is not much
point in arriving at new arrangements in regard
to commodities unless this is accompanied by
reduction in tariff values. And having posed that
question, what about non-tariff barriers which
contribute a large part of the problem of ensuring
a fairer trading pattern? Then again there seems
little point in debating the transfer of technologies
unless the fruits of the transferred technology
have fair access to world markets.
Moreover, I think you put your ideal statesman
in an impossible situation. Is he likely to consider
the requirements of the "speedy" or will he
recognise the more urgent needs of the "needy".
The answer depends on whether he comes from
one of the better-off developing countries or from
one of the poorest. Thus if he comes from a
country in the first group with a fast growing
industrialising economy he will lay special em-
phasis on removal of tariff and on non-tariff
barriers to his country's exports. If he comes
from a very poor country he might argue for
commodity agreements (assuming that his country
has anything to export) but while this might be
beneficial to all developing countries its feasibility
is probably doubtful. Again the greater benefit
would accrue to the better-off developing coun-
tries and even to the developed world itself.
I have no doubt myself that debt rescheduling
would be of general benefit and I would plump
for it, but is it feasible given the attitudes of most
lending countries? When I was in India some
years ago I was told plainly that the net effect of
easing the debt burden would probably be nil
since the volume of aid would be correspondingly
reduced.
For me the first priority is raising the incomes of
the very poor in order to make the maximum
impact on world poverty. That means increasing
commitments for aid towards the 0.7 per cent
target, encouraging trade by the reduction of
tariff and non-tariff barriers, and making an
effort to secure international agreement to reduce
the indebtedness of developing countries.
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GUY F. ERB, Senior Fellow, Development
Council, Washington.
International commodities policy is an appropriate
focus for developing country action at UNCTAD
IV. Commodities trade is of critical importance
for many developing nations; negotiations in this
area offer an opportunity for meaningful bargain-
ing with developed nations; and real progress on
commodity policy would allow attention to be
directed subsequently to other parts of the
emerging strategy for international development
action. The allocation of development assistance
to the poorest peoples within developing nations
is a good example of such pending issues.
UNCTAD IV and the related discussions in the
Conference on International Economic Co-opera-
tion (CIEC) could address the commodities prob-
lem in the following manner:with concerted
developing-nation support, the UNCTAD could
set a framework for ongoing commodity negotia-
tions. These negotiations should be based on
commitments by all parties to negotiate arrange-
ments, including buffer stock systems, for selected
commodities and to undertake parallel talks on
the common or separate financing of the stocks
operations. With guidelines and deadlines for
these negotiations set by UNCTAD IV, the
CIEC and the UNCTAD Committee on Com-
modities could serve as monitoring mechanisms
for the specific negotiations on individual com-
modities and on buffer stock arrangements. If
these negotiations fail, raw material producers
and exporters may well give priority to the
difficult (and more costly) alternative of seeking
improved prices and earnings stability through
concerted producer-country action alone.
CHEDDI JAGAN, General Secretary, People's
Progressive Party, Guyana.
Although UNCTAD is concerned with tr.ade and
development, the emphasis generally seems to be
on trade, especially as there was disillusionment
with conditional aid'aid with strings'and the
gap in living standards between developed and
developing countries continued to widen. "Trade
not aid" became the panacea for underdevelop-
ment.
Clearly, poor countries lose a great deal from
unequal international tradealmost perpetually
buying dear and selling cheap.
But unequal trade is not the most important single
factor in underdevelopment, better prices for
raw materials will not automatically bring about
real development. It can permit the foreign
companies, which own most of the mines and
plantations in "third world" countries, to siphon
off greater profits overseas in one way or another
as is now happening in the key sugar industry in
Guyana.
And even if a substantial part of the increased
prices is collected by the government in export
levies or other forms of taxation, it can be sqan-
dered on a huge bureaucraticadministrative and
police-military elite (personal emoluments in
Guyana have jumped from G$27 million in 1964
to G$l 30 million in 1976), in infrastructure, show
pieces and even foreign investment.
It is therefore necessary to isolate the root cause
of underdevelopment and poverty; namely,
foreign ownership of the means of production,
distribution and exchange, and an imposed pro-
imperialist economic planning strategy.
In the immediate post-war period, "third world"
countries particularly in Latin America were
"sold" the Puerto Rican model based on the
false idea that foreign capital was indispensable
for economic and social development; and since
capital was scarce, an investment climate must be
created with all kinds of concessionstax holiday,
duty-free imports of equipment and materials,
subsidized services, repatriation of capital and
profits, weak trade unions and anti-labour
measures.
But by 1960, the position worsened. And the
United Nations established the first UN Develop-
ment Decade to stem the widening gap in living
standards between the "third-world" and the
imperialist states.
For Latin America, the UN Economic Com-
mission for Latin America proposed a planning
strategy based on import substitution, import-
substituting industrialisation, land reform, re-
gional integration and foreign capital.
Import substitution was to bring an end to finan-
cial losses from buying dear and selling cheap;
land reform would provide the food, the raw
materials for the industries and the income in the
hands of the peasants to purchase the locally-
produced manufactured goods from the import-
substituting industries; foreign aid (capital) was
necessary to pay compensation for land and to
establish factories; regional integration would
ensure mass production and cheap commodities-
such was the rationale behind the ECLA model.
But by the end of the First Development Decade,
the position was worse than at the beginning.
The ECA model, like the reformist Alliance for
Progress, which was introduced as a counter to
Castroism, ended in failure. The transnational
companies and the local oligarchieslatifundistas
and compradore capitalistsbled the countries
and peoples more than ever. Capital outflows in
the early 1970's in the form of profits, dividends,
debt payments, interest, monetary and trade losses
far exceeded capital inflows into Latin America.
Meanwhile, "third world" countries, which were
forced with tied aid to concentrate on infrastruc-
ture schemes (about three-quarters of the G$300
million Guyana Development Plan of 1966-72
was devoted to infrastructure) were crushed by a
growing debt burden (debt payments in Guyana
increased from G$lO million in 1964 to G$100
million in 1976, nearly one-third of the current
budgetary expenditure).
Under these conditions, the people's conditions
worsened and the situation became more explo-
sive.
It is necessary, therefore, to take a revolutionary
and integrated approach to the problem of under-
development.
This means firstly bringing an end to foreign
economic domination by nationalisation of the
"commanding heights" of the economy: and
secondly, correcting an unbalanced, distorted
economy with negligible or deformed industriali-
sation by planned proportional development of
the economy with emphasis simultaneously on
industry and agriculture, expansion particularly
of the public and co-operative sectors, a radical
land reform, and shift in trade and other relations
from the capitalist to the "third" and socialist
worlds.
The Soviet Union (particularly in its Central-
Asian territories) and Cuba have demonstrated
that is it possible to banish poverty, hunger,
illiteracy and backwardness. "Third World"
countries would do well to make a through study
of the model of political-economy of these
countries.
V. K. R. V. RAO, Director, Institute for Social
and Economic Change, Ban galore.
The developing world is still as far from nearing
the developed world as it was before the start of
the so-called development decades. In fact, the
gap has widened and it appears as if it will
continue to do so, in spite of the many resolutions
and many more speeches that are made at various
international forums on the need of increasing
development assistance to the LDCs, stabilising
prices of their raw materials and primary com-
modities, improving their terms of trade, removing
trade barriers to their exports, transferring tech-
nology to their industry and agriculture and to
help them to help themselves more efficiently and
with more speed. Of course, a great deal, in fact
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the bulk of the development effort, has to be
done by the LDCs themselves; but we are here
concerned only with the role that development
assistance can play in promoting development. To
do this effectively, and with continuity, develop-
ment assistance has to be in terms of untied and
continuing financial resources that can be used
by LDCs to purchase goods or services or both
at competitive prices in the markets most appro-
priate for their individual economies. Much of the
aid that comes from outside international agencies
does not satisfy this requirement. Moreover, the
amount of development assistance now given is
even below the pledged international commit-
ments of the developed world. Even of what is
given, both distribution and continuity are influ-
enced by political considerations on the part of
individual developed countries. What is needed
therefore is a method of development assistance
that is independent of the national political
interests of individual developed countries, is
freely usable for purchase of services or goods at
the will of the recipients from markets which they
feel most appropriate to meet their requirements;
and at the same time, not only is not discontinuous
but also grows automatically with the building
up of foreign exchange surplus by individual
developed countries. An ideal instrument for
this purpose is the SDR Link. Such a link could
be used for financing the deficits of individual
developing countries and also for financing the
international agencies, existing or to be set up,
for meeting the requirements of the developing
countries in respect of food, buffer-stocks, capital
equipment, patents, licences, etc. The Link will
have the further advantage of falling on the
developed countries which have surpluses, while
helping those which have deficits. It would make
development assistance truly autonomous and
international, also possibly painless, and endow
it with an in-built growth independent of political
fluctuations. The Link will also take care of the
problem of surpluses of oil exporting countries.
I would therefore give first priority to the SDR
Link amongst the various methods being dis-
cussed for the promotion of economic develop-
ment.
TIM JOSLING, Professor of Economics,
Department of Agricultural Economics and
Management, University of Reading.
I feel that a meaningful breakthrough on trade in
processed raw materials might give the most hope
to the Developing Countries. A variety of
measures, including high effective rates of pro-
tection, act to keep raw materials processing
activity within the presently industrialised coun-
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tries. The effects of moving the processing nearer
to the raw material source would be to increase
employment and income levels in developing
countries. It would also solve many of the
problems of price instability in raw material
marketsin a more permanent way than inter-
national buffer stocks. Lastly, it would defuse
somewhat the issue of multi-national companies
which are often seen as the exploitative arm of
developed country processing sectors. Although
it may not seem a propitious time, during an
economic recession, to suggest reductions in
processing protection, it may be even less desir-
able to wait until these industries have invested
for the expansion of the next boom period.
EDITh PENROSE, Professor of Economics,
School of Oriental and African Studies, University
of London.
Of the items on your list I would choose to press
for two. I think that a reduction in tariff barriers
and the promotion of freer trade all round would
be by far the greatest advantage to the LDCs.
Anything that would encourage exports through
increased opportunities and incentives for local
business (and hopefully reduce some of the
import barriers in the LDCs would, I think, be
more helpful to development than efforts to
increase (or stabilise) foreign exchange receipts,
through loans or other devices.
I fear, though, that the above is not very feasible
on the scale that would be necessary, for so far
GATF preferences have not done much to change
matters. One is unlikely to move very fast in this
direction. Hence taking into account feasibility,
I vote for the establishment of a strong advisory
service to help LDCs deal with multinational
corporations, both potential and actual.
ISMAIL-SABRI ABDALLA, Director General,
Institute of National Planning, Cairo.
All measures suggested are attractive. Feasibility
is in many cases a matter of time; what is not
feasible to-day might become operational within
the coming five or ten years. The benefits on the
contrary, vary greatly both regarding the number
of countries and the order of magnitude; in some
cases they are even questionable from a long-
term point of view.
That is why I think the most immediate measure
should be the establishment of a strong "Develop-
ment Co-operation Organization for the Third
World"something that can become the counter-
part of OECD. Such an agency should be of
course intergovernmental, but for its own success
it should focus on surveys, analyses and forecasts,
avoiding as much as possible binding recommen-
dations. It will fullfill the following objectives:
Exchange of information among LDCs con-
cerning markets, financial and other conditions
of transfer of technology, MNCs and laws on
foreign investments etc.
Identification of areas of co-operation at all
levels: joint ventures, producers associations,
scientific and technological research, cases for
subregional integration etc.
Mobilization of some of the Third World
intellectual capacity in search for development
alternatives, negotiation strategies, assessment of
different proposed measures (such as in the case
of the reform of the international monetary
system).
Promotion of studies concerned with cultural
identity, better mutual knowledge and under-
standing, reciprocal technical assistance etc.
I believe that the coming years will be those of
hard confrontations and tough negotiations. The
statement of principles and the formulation of
claims may remain simple rhetoric, unless the
Third World, through thorough studies, elaborate
tactics, and hard detailed proposals, can prove
itself able to match all the subtleties of the
advanced West.
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